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Abstract 
 The impact of Brexit is investigated using two computable general equilibrium 
(CGE) models, featuring conventional constant-returns-to-scale (CRS) technology and 
increasing-returns-to-scale (IRS) technology with firm heterogeneity, à la Melitz. The 
imposition of trade barriers would trigger a significant contraction of the bilateral trade 
between the United Kingdom (UK) and the rest of the European Union (EU). While a CRS 
CGE model predicts that the trade barriers would benefit or only marginally harm the UK’s 
welfare, the IRS model predicts a larger loss through firm exit and loss of varieties, 
comparable to the expected saving of the UK’s contribution to the EU budget. Among the UK 
industries, the textiles and apparel, steel and metal, and automotive and transportation 
equipment sectors would suffer most severely from their sharp fall in exports. 
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1. Introduction 
 The Internal Market of the European Union (EU) has grown continuously by 
accepting new member countries, with Croatia being the 28th country to join in 2013. On 
June 23, 2016, the referendum for the withdrawal of the United Kingdom (UK) from the 
EU—Brexit—shook the EU, which has managed to maintain regional cohesion even 
following the European sovereign debt crisis. Just before the referendum, many economic 
studies assessed the impacts of Brexit quantitatively. They employed structural general 
equilibrium models, especially computable general equilibrium (CGE) models and new 
quantitative trade models (NQTMs) based on a gravity model to predict the consequences of 
Brexit. These studies tried to analyze the Brexit impact, based mainly on a theoretical 
framework because empirical data are not available to measure the impact before the event. 
 Brexit has created many uncertainties regarding the future of Europe—including 
the short-run and long-run impacts of tariff and nontariff barriers between the UK and the 
rest of the EU (EU27), the common agricultural policy (CAP), regulatory policy and standards, 
and foreign direct investment (FDI)—however, the UK’s contributions to the EU budget can 
be estimated based on recent data. As a result of these uncertainties, even when similar 
frameworks are used, the estimates of the macroeconomic effects vary widely among studies. 
The majority of studies estimate a moderate decline, “in the low single digit percentage range,” 
in terms of GDP, as surveyed by Busch and Matthes (2016). For example, using a GTAP-
based world trade dynamic CGE model, Booth et al. (2015) estimated a worst-case reduction 
in GDP of 2.2% in 2030 for the UK, from losses associated with tariff imposition (−0.9%), 
border costs (−1.2%), and nontariff barriers (NTBs) on goods (−0.5%), but a saving from its 
EU budget contribution (+0.5%). Boulanger and Philippidis (2015) used their world trade 
CGE model calibrated to the GTAP Database and estimated an income effect for 2020. They 
found that a 2% trade cost rise would almost cancel out the benefit of the EU budget saving 
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and that a 5% rise would lead to a 0.7% loss in terms of UK GDP.1 PwC (2016), using a single-
country dynamic CGE model, estimated a total loss of GDP of 1.2–5.5%, through anticipated 
trade-related barriers (0.5–2.1% GDP loss), short-run uncertainty in capital markets (0.9–
2.6% GDP loss), and migration (0.8–1.6% GDP loss). Ottaviano et al. (2014), using a NQTM, 
estimated a total loss of GDP of 1.1–3.1%, which they attributed to most favored nation 
(MFN) tariff imposition (0.14%), short-run NTBs (0.4–0.9%), and long-run NTBs (1.3–2.6%). 
 These analyses suffer from two drawbacks.2 One is that they focused only on a few 
aggregate outcome measures, such as the change in GDP or net household income—i.e., 
Hicksian equivalent variations (EVs)—and thus did not analyze sectoral output and trade 
changes, though their multisectoral models were capable of such analyses. This was probably 
for convenience and simplicity of presentation for the voters. The other drawback is that they 
did not consider heterogeneity of firms and increasing returns to scale with love of variety, 
which have been recognized as a key driver of the strong growth in trade in the globalized 
world economy (Melitz (2003)).3 Brexit will cause the restoration of some forms of trade 
barriers and reduce the level of trade between the UK and the EU27. This negative impact 
would be intensified if firms exit from export markets. Such firm exit would reduce firm 
productivity and harm consumers directly through the loss of the varieties supplied by the 
trade partners who have enjoyed free access to the Internal Market. 
 In this study, we develop two world trade CGE models. One is a standard constant-
returns-to-scale (CRS) model. The other is an increasing-returns-to-scale (IRS) model, 
featuring the Melitz (2003) structure. We conduct the Brexit experiments with these two 
                                                     
1 They assumed no tariffs between the UK and the EU27 after Brexit. 
2 Another drawback is that the GTAP Database that these CGE studies used was version 8 with a 
reference year of 2007, which is one version older than the current version 9. 
3 PwC (2016) incorporated imperfect competition with product differentiation, à la Dixit and Stiglitz 
(1977), in a single-country dynamic CGE model. 
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models, particularly focusing on the effect of firm exit and loss of variety induced by 
restoration of trade barriers. In the experiments, we examine (1) the imposition of import 
tariffs between the UK and the EU27, (2) an increase in transportation costs, and (3) an 
increase in the fixed costs of exporting. Our numerical simulations using a standard CGE 
model without firm heterogeneity show that the restoration of tariff barriers alone would be 
beneficial for the UK. An increase in transportation costs would only slightly reduce UK 
welfare. In contrast, our Melitz CGE model predicts that Brexit would be harmful for the UK 
through firm exit and the resulting substantial loss of variety for consumers. UK industries, 
especially textiles and apparel, steel and metal, and automotive and transport equipment, 
would experience a sharp reduction in both exports and production. 
 Section 2 describes our CGE models with/without IRS technology and firm 
heterogeneity. Section 3 presents our Brexit simulation scenarios. The simulation results are 
presented in Section 4. Section 5 provides concluding comments, followed by some 
qualifications of the analysis, which suggest future research using a CGE model. The 
appendix presents the sensitivity analysis of the simulation results in Section 4. 
 
2. World Trade CGE Model with Melitz Structure 
 Our world trade CGE model is a static model with three regions (the UK, the EU27, 
and the rest of the world (ROW)), 10 sectors, and three primary factors (skilled and unskilled 
labor, and capital). The primary factors are flexibly reallocated among sectors to achieve price 
equalization within each region. We develop two CGE models: 
(1) Armington CGE model with CRS technology 
(2) Melitz CGE model with IRS technology 
 In the Melitz CGE model, we assume that six manufacturing sectors are equipped 
with the features of the Melitz (2003) model (Table 2.1). Based on the standard CGE model 
with CRS technology by Hosoe et al. (2010), we incorporate firm heterogeneity, product 
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differentiation, and monopolistic competition, following Dixon et al. (2016), and refer to this 
as the Melitz structure subsequently. Figure 2.1 describes the core part of the model 
structure. The domestic output in the i-th sector in the r-th region riZ ,  is made using 
primary factors and intermediates with a fixed setup cost 
MLZ
riH , . Out of riZ , , srikZZ ,,,  is 
used to produce the k-th variety shipped to the s-th region (including that shipped to the 
domestic region r) srikQT ,,,  with a fixed variety production cost 
MLZ
sriF ,, . The variety srikQT ,,,  
is aggregated into a variety composite good sriQT ,,  in a constant elasticity of substitution 
(CES) function with the elasticity of substitution 
MLZ
i , à la Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). 
 
Table 2.1: List of Sectors, Elasticity of Substitution 
ARM
i  
Sectors (abbreviation) Elasticity of 
substitution 
ARM
i b 
UK/EU27 tariff rates 
applied to non-EU 
members (%)b 
Agriculture (AGR) 2.39 2.2/2.6 
Mining (MIN) 5.31 0.0/0.0 
Textiles and Apparel (TXA)a 3.78 6.3/7.2 
Food and Beverages (FOD)a 2.49 10.0/11.9 
Chemical (CHM)a 2.80 1.2/1.4 
Steel and Metal (STL)a 3.54 0.9/1.0 
Automotive and Transport Equipment (AUT)a 3.16 2.7/2.6 
Other Manufacturing (MAN)a 3.89 1.0/1.1 
Transportation (TRS) 1.90 –/– 
Services (SRV) 1.94 –/– 
Note: 
a: Indicates sectors equipped with the Melitz structure in the Melitz CGE model. 
b: Obtained from the GTAP Database version 9A. 
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Figure 2.1: Melitz CGE Model Structure 
 
Note: This figure shows the commodity flows of the i-th sector in the r-th region, as 
illustrated for a single-country model by Hosoe et al. (2010). The production process of the 
domestic output riZ ,  is omitted for simplicity. The trade partners are denoted by r, s, and 
s’; variety producers are denoted by k and k’. The dot   represents the “average 
productivity firm.” 
 
 The fixed costs 
MLZ
riH , and 
MLZ
sriF ,,  are measured in terms of domestic output riZ ,  
units, following Itakura and Oyamada (2015). While Melitz (2003) originally measured these 
fixed costs in terms of labor units, various approaches have been used in CGE analysis. Zhai 
(2008) assumed a combination of capital, labor, and intermediates for the fixed inputs, while 
Balistreri and Rutherford (2013) used a composite factor (i.e., a mix of capital and labor). A 
firm’s productivity is determined by a draw from a Pareto distribution, following Melitz 
(2003). In this setup, while all the operating firms ship their output to the domestic market, 
only very productive ones that can afford to pay the fixed cost of exporting are engaged in 
exporting.4 
                                                     
4 Details of the model are available upon request. 
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 The Armington (1969) composite good riQ ,  is made using the variety composite 
rsiQT ,,  suppled from the three regions according to a CES aggregation function with an 
elasticity of substitution of 
ARM
i . When we use the same elasticity value for 
ARM
i  and 
MLZ
i , the two-stage nested CES functions reduce to a single-stage one, as originally 
employed by Melitz (2003). Departing from Melitz’s original model, we distinguish between 
these two elasticities so that we can separately examine the effect of heterogeneity of goods 
among sources (the Armington structure) and that of firm heterogeneity and product 
differentiation in the four IRS sectors (the Melitz structure). 
 The Armington composite good riQ ,  is used by domestic agents: household 
p
riX , , 
government 
g
riX , , investment 
v
riX , , and intermediates rjiX ,, . We assume a Cobb–Douglas-
type utility function for the household. The government consumption and the investment 
uses are exogenous, while a lump-sum direct tax and household savings are adjusted 
endogenously to cover these expenses. Regarding macro-closure, we assume that the current 
account deficits are exogenous in terms of the ROW’s currency. 
 The Armington CGE model (as well as the CRS sectors in the Melitz CGE model) is 
not equipped with the abovementioned Melitz structure. In this case, the domestic output 
riZ ,  is used directly in the production of sriQT ,, without any variety or fixed costs. Many 
models are equipped with a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function to determine 
allocation between exports and domestic supply (i.e., imperfect transformation between 
them). However, we do not include a CET function (or, equivalently, assume perfect 
transformation between exports and domestic supply) in order to make the model structures 
of these two CRS and IRS models similar. This highlights the role of the Melitz structure in 
our simulation analysis. 
 The model is calibrated to the GTAP Database version 9A, whose reference year is 
2011, with the elasticity of substitution 
ARM
i  taken from the same database (Hertel (1997)). 
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Regarding the parameters that characterize the Melitz structure, we use the estimate of 3.8 
by Bernard et al. (2003) for 
MLZ
i  and the estimate of 4.6 by Balistreri et al. (2011) for the 
shape parameter of the Pareto distribution, which determines firms’ productivities. We apply 
these parameters for the six IRS sectors in all the regions, following the common practice in 
CGE analysis (e.g., Dixon et al. (2016) and Balistreri and Rutherford (2013)). 
 
3. Simulation Scenarios 
 While Brexit is anticipated to trigger various changes in economic and political 
systems, we focus on the essential factors that are likely to be realized in the near future and 
to affect the trade between the UK and the EU27. We consider the following three scenarios. 
Scenario 1: Tariff Imposition 
 Both parties impose import tariffs as high as those that they apply to the non-EU 
members. In many Brexit studies, this is called the World Trade Organization (WTO) option, 
which follows the MFN principal. In reality, after negotiations for (successful) Brexit, the UK 
and the EU27 may reach a free trade agreement (FTA), similar to that with Switzerland or 
Norway. In this sense, this is a pessimistic scenario in terms of the size of the tariff barriers. 
 As indicated in Table 2.1, the MFN tariff rates are very low, as often observed in 
many developed countries, except for TXA and FOD. These two sectors are major sources of 
goods for household consumption. Therefore, the MFN tariff imposition between the UK and 
the EU27 is expected to affect household welfare substantially. 
Scenario 2: Transportation Cost Rise + Tariff Imposition 
 Transportation costs between the two parties are assumed to increase by 10% or 
20%, on top of the tariff imposition assumed in Scenario 1. The sizes of these increases in 
transportation costs are chosen arbitrarily, because it is difficult to estimate the additional 
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pecuniary and nonpecuniary transportation costs at the border between the UK and the 
EU27 without the free movements of goods, as guaranteed within the Internal Market. The 
status quo transportation costs are calibrated to the international transportation costs 
reported in the GTAP Database. 
Scenario 3: Export Fixed Cost Rise + Tariff Imposition 
 In addition to the tariff imposition assumed in Scenario 1, export fixed costs 
between the two parties are assumed to increase by 10% or 20%. This increase is also 
assumed arbitrarily because the actual cost increases are unknown. This shock is assumed 
only for the IRS sectors in the Melitz CGE model. This experiment is not conducted for the 
Armington CGE model, which is not equipped with the Melitz structure. 
 We simulate Brexit under these three scenarios in the absence/presence of firm 
heterogeneity. We did not consider the impact of the EU budget contribution in our 
simulation experiments but will compare it with the welfare impact predicted by the CGE 
models in our discussion. We do not consider many other factors that are related to the “other 
three freedoms” in the Internal Market. In this sense, our simulation scenarios are 
conservative in terms of the coverage of the anticipated shocks and thus indicate the 
minimum impact of Brexit. 
 
4. Simulation Results 
4.1 Shrinking UK–EU27 Trade 
 When we employ the Armington CGE model—without any firm heterogeneity—the 
tariff imposition (Scenario 1) would reduce exports from the UK to the EU27 and that from 
the EU27 to the UK in almost all the sectors (Figure 4.1). Among them, TXA and FOD would 
experience the largest reduction in trade of 6–12% following the tariff imposition. The trade 
loss seems to be similar between the UK and the EU27. AUT in the UK, which serves as the 
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bridgehead to the Internal Market, is the only exception in that it would experience trade 
losses that are twice as large as those in the EU27. Even when we additionally include a 
transportation cost increase of 10% or 20% (Scenario 2), the trade losses are similar in terms 
of both pattern and magnitude. 
 
Figure 4.1: Impact of Brexit on Bilateral Exports from the UK (top) and EU27 (bottom) 
(change from the base, %) 
 
 
-50.0
-40.0
-30.0
-20.0
-10.0
0.0
10.0
AGR MIN TXA FOD CHM STL AUT MAN TRS SRV
Armington Tariff
Armington Trans. C. (+10%)
Armington Trans. C. (+20%)
Melitz Tariff
Melitz Trans. C. (+10%)
Melitz Trans. C. (+20%)
Melitz Fixed C. (+10%)
Melitz Fixed C. (+20%)
-50.0
-40.0
-30.0
-20.0
-10.0
0.0
10.0
AGR MIN TXA FOD CHM STL AUT MAN TRS SRV
Armington Tariff
Armington Trans. C. (+10%)
Armington Trans. C. (+20%)
Melitz Tariff
Melitz Trans. C. (+10%)
Melitz Trans. C. (+20%)
Melitz Fixed C. (+10%)
Melitz Fixed C. (+20%)
Impact of Brexit: Firm Exit and Loss of Variety  Page 10 
 As the theory of firm heterogeneity suggests, our Melitz CGE model predicts 
significantly larger trade losses, especially in the six IRS sectors. The predicted losses are 
double in TXA, STL, AUT, and MAN, compared with the predicted losses in the Armington 
CGE model. The trade losses in the transportation cost rise case (Scenario 2) are only 
marginally different from those in the tariff-imposition-only case (Scenario 1) also in the 
Melitz model. The export fixed cost rise, in contrast, would cause large additional trade losses. 
This is particularly marked in CHM, STL, AUT, and MAN. 
 In the Melitz CGE model, these trade losses are closely linked to firm exit from the 
export markets (Figure 4.2). The tariff imposition (Scenario 1) would reduce the number of 
the UK exporters by 30–50% in TXA and 25–40% in FOD. The number of AUT exporters, or 
the number of model types produced in the UK, would be reduced by 14% following the 
imposition of small tariffs—less than 3%—and further by the export fixed cost increase. This 
could lead to a drastic contraction of this industry in the UK as an export platform of 
automotive and aviation products to the Internal Market as discussed by, e.g., Inagaki (2016). 
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Figure 4.2: Impact of Brexit on the Number of Exporting Firms in the UK (top) and EU27 
(bottom) 
(change from the base, %) 
 
 
 
4.2 Costs and Benefits of Protectionism 
 Brexit could protect some particular sectors in the UK, such as AGR and FOD in 
the Armington CGE model case (Figure 4.3). This protection is possible only by sacrificing 
production in many other sectors, especially TXA, CHM, STL, and AUT. While the UK output 
loss would sometimes exceed 1%, the EU27 would experience only marginal losses or gains. 
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This is because of the difference in the sizes of these economies. The EU27 is 4.7 times larger 
than the UK in terms of GDP and 6.9 times larger in terms of population. Trade losses of the 
same size, therefore, would be translated into significantly different output losses because of 
the differences in the sizes of these two economies. 
 
Figure 4.3: Impact of Brexit on Output in the UK (top) and EU27 (bottom) 
(change from the base, %) 
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 The trade reduction under the Melitz structure would lead to a larger Brexit impact 
on output. This is particularly obvious in the losing sectors TXA, STL, and AUT and in the 
gaining sectors AGR and FOD. However, the impact is complex in some sectors. For example, 
in Scenarios 1 and 2, the results for MIN and MAN in the UK have opposite signs between 
the two models. The loss in CHM in Scenario 1 as predicted by the Melitz CGE model is 
smaller than that predicted by the Armington CGE model. The impact of the export fixed cost 
increase (Scenario 3) on output is not necessarily straightforward, either. The output loss in 
TXA would be alleviated by the export fixed cost rise in Scenario 3, compared with that 
predicted in Scenario 1. This is because, in a general equilibrium framework, an 
increase/decrease of output in one sector must be accompanied by output changes in the 
opposite direction under a resource constraint. The consequence of Brexit is complex, 
especially under the Melitz structure. 
 
4.3 Macroeconomic Consequences 
 In the previous section, the impact of Brexit was analyzed for the industrial sectors. 
In this subsection, we examine the overall macroeconomic impact. In particular, does the EU 
budget contribution saving of around 0.5% of UK GDP justify Brexit? Figure 4.4 shows the 
welfare impact using EVs, which measure the total income effects on the household in the 
three regions. When we employ the Armington CGE model, Brexit with tariff imposition only 
(Scenario 1) would create a small welfare gain in the UK.5  With a transportation cost 
increase (Scenario 2), the welfare impact would be negative but not large. These welfare 
impact estimates imply that the UK voters might well favor the Brexit option for the EU 
budget savings. 
                                                     
5 The UK’s positive gain from MFN tariff imposition becomes smaller with larger Armington elasticities 
ARM
i . When we assume a 40% larger value for 
ARM
i , the welfare impact would be negative. 
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Figure 4.4: Impact of Brexit on Welfare 
(equivalent variations, mil. USD) 
 
 
 In contrast to the finding of a small Brexit welfare gain or loss for the UK under the 
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harder. Behind the “lose–lose” deal between the UK and the EU27, the ROW would always 
gain by exploiting the benefits of trade diversion from the Internal Market to the ROW. 
 We have not explicitly considered the saving of the EU budget contribution by the 
UK in our scenarios or models. Now, we compare the estimated loss for the UK with this EU 
budget saving of about 0.5% of UK GDP. The predicted UK welfare impact ranges from a loss 
of as much as 0.48% of the base run GDP (Scenario 3: the tariff imposition plus a 20% increase 
of export fixed costs in the Melitz CGE model) to a 0.02% gain (Scenario 1: only the tariff 
imposition in the Armington CGE model). Although we assume only trade-related barriers 
anticipated after Brexit, this indicates that the worst case in our simulations could yield a 
large welfare loss comparable to the budget saving that Brexit advocates expected at the 
referendum. 
 As mentioned in many CGE analyses, the simulation results depend on the assumed 
parameters, especially the elasticity of substitution. We conduct a sensitivity analysis and 
find that a larger 
ARM
i  and smaller 
MLZ
i  result in a larger welfare impact of Brexit. On 
the other hand, the EU27 would suffer slightly less under a smaller 
ARM
i . Its welfare 
impact is unclear under an alternative 
MLZ
i  (detailed results of the sensitivity analysis are 
shown in the Appendix). Note that all CGE studies with the Melitz-type IRS feature, to the 
best of the author’s knowledge, combine these two elasticities and collapse the two-stage CES 
nests of the Armington and the variety composites into a one-stage CES nest, following the 
original specification by Melitz (2003).6 These models do not distinguish the different roles 
of these two elasticities but jointly examine their impact with one elasticity of substitution. 
Our sensitivity analysis shows that these two elasticities could alter the welfare impact 
                                                     
6 They followed Melitz’s original model with a single-nest CES specification partly for simplicity of the 
model and partly for examination of the welfare impact equivalence with respect to “trade elasticities” 
with CGE models, which was proposed by Arkolakis et al. (2012). 
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estimates in different directions and that the effect of one elasticity could be either larger or 
smaller than that of the other elasticity in our empirical setting. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 We conducted a Brexit impact analysis using a state-of-the-art CGE model with 
firm heterogeneity, which evokes productivity changes from firm exit and loss of variety. The 
scope of our Brexit scenarios is limited to trade-related barriers disconnecting the UK from 
the remaining EU 27 members. In this sense, our impact estimates should be considered as 
lower-bound estimates. Even so, depending on the magnitude of an export fixed cost increase, 
the cost of Brexit could be as large as the savings of the EU budget contribution by the UK, 
which were considered to be the most important economic benefit of Brexit. This large impact 
originating from productivity changes with heterogeneous firms was not predicted by the 
earlier Brexit CGE studies without the Melitz feature. 
 Adding the omitted Brexit factors, the net negative impacts could be substantially 
larger. Needless to say, such possible economic losses might be found to be acceptable and 
reasonable by the UK voters as the cost of their sovereignty, free from regulations and 
bureaucracy by the European Commission. Nevertheless, their decision must be firmly based 
on accurate and comprehensive estimates of the costs and benefits of their policy options, not 
only for the Brexit referendum but also for future post-Brexit negotiations. Our analysis 
provides detailed simulation results at the sectoral level, unlike the earlier studies, which 
focused on aggregate indicators, probably for convenience and simplicity of presentation to 
the voters. Such omissions limit the benefits of analysis using multisectoral models such as 
CGE models. We demonstrated that the gains and losses would vary among sectors. Our 
results enable richer policy discussions for reshaping the future European economy under 
some form of bilateral treaties, such as FTA or customs union, between the UK and the EU27. 
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 Our study, however, as mentioned above, focused on the trade-related factors 
associated with Brexit expected in the near future, not considering any dynamic factors, such 
as domestic investment and FDI, which drive the European economy in a long run. An 
extension involving dynamic analysis with FDI, à la Hosoe (2014) for goods producers and 
Tarr (2013) for service providers, would enable us to describe the deceleration of trade 
fragmentation in Europe and the resulting long-run cost of Brexit. We could also examine 
the impact of Brexit on immigration using the most recent GTAP Database, which contains 
detailed labor data. 
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Appendix Sensitivity Analysis 
 We conduct a sensitivity analysis by changing the values of the elasticity of 
substitution for the Armington CES function 
ARM
i  and that for the variety aggregation 
CES function 
MLZ
i . Figure A.1 shows that a larger 
ARM
i  intensifies the changes of exports, 
the number of exporting firms, and output. Table A.1 shows that a 5% larger value of 
ARM
i  
reduces welfare (i.e., larger negative impact of Brexit) by 5–20% for the UK, compared with 
the base case. In contrast, a change in the elasticity parameter increases welfare marginally 
for the EU27. 
 A smaller elasticity 
MLZ
i  gives a larger impact on exports, the number of 
exporting firms, and output (Figure A.2–A.3). When we employ a 5% larger/smaller elasticity 
value for 
MLZ
i , we find a 10–15% better/20–30% worse welfare outcome (i.e., smaller/larger 
negative impact of Brexit) for the UK (Table A.1). This is because the elasticity of substitution 
among the varieties 
MLZ
i  is negatively linked with the markup rate and thus the intensity 
of imperfect competition and economies of scale. That is, the larger monopoly profits produced 
by a smaller elasticity in the status quo would be lost following Brexit. Therefore, the 
negative impact of Brexit for the UK would be exacerbated further. For the EU27, however, 
the effect of the alternative value of 
MLZ
i  does not show either a significant or clear 
tendency among these cases, except for the cases in Scenario 3. 
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Figure A.1: Impact of Brexit on the UK (left) and EU27 (right) with a 5% Larger Elasticity 
for 
ARM
i  
Output (change from the base, %) 
 
Bilateral Exports (change from the base, %) 
 
Number of Exporting Firms (change from the base, %) 
 
Welfare (equivalent variations, mil. USD) 
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Figure A.2: Impact of Brexit on the UK (left) and EU27 (right) with 5% Larger Elasticity for 
MLZ
i  
Output (change from the base, %) 
 
Bilateral Exports (change from the base, %) 
 
Number of Exporting Firms (change from the base, %) 
 
Welfare (equivalent variations, mil. USD) 
 
Note: The simulation results with the Armington CGE model, which does not contain 
MLZ
i , are the same as for the base case and thus are omitted. 
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Figure A.3: Impact of Brexit on the UK (left) and EU27 (right) with 5% Smaller Elasticity 
for 
MLZ
i  
Output (change from the base, %) 
 
Bilateral Exports (change from the base, %) 
 
Number of Exporting Firms (change from the base, %) 
 
Welfare (Equivalent variations, mil. USD) 
 
Note: The simulation results with the Armington CGE model, which does not contain 
MLZ
i , are the same as for the base case and thus are omitted. 
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Table A.1: Welfare Impact with Alternative Elasticity Values 
(Equivalent variations, mil. USD) 
 
Tariff
Trans. C.
(+10%)
Trans. C.
(+20%)
Tariff
Trans. C.
(+10%)
Trans. C.
(+20%)
Fixed C.
(+10%)
Fixed C.
(+20%)
UK
Base 354 −279 −907 −3,350 −4,047 −4,735 −7,410 −10,948
σARM+5% 299 −330 −955 −4,121 −4,824 −5,515 −8,270 −11,846
σMLZ+5% −2,840 −3,539 −4,230 −6,269 −9,292
σMLZ−5% −4,329 −5,024 −5,707 −9,129 −13,219
EU27
Base −2,638 −3,077 −3,512 −3,210 −3,575 −3,939 −5,602 −7,743
σARM+5% −2,613 −3,048 −3,479 −3,145 −3,495 −3,844 −5,521 −7,651
σMLZ+5% −3,211 −3,583 −3,953 −5,235 −7,053
σMLZ−5% −3,309 −3,663 −4,017 −6,098 −8,589
ROW
Base 1,243 1,462 1,678 3,058 3,117 3,177 4,422 5,615
σARM+5% 1,243 1,456 1,666 3,683 3,736 3,789 5,130 6,380
σMLZ+5% 2,717 2,789 2,861 3,836 4,827
σMLZ−5% 3,878 3,921 3,965 5,547 6,970
Melitz ModelArmington Model
